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Voegele: EPA's Problematic Enforcement Policy for the RLRA Section 3004(j)

1995]
EPA'S PROBLEMATIC ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR THE
RCRA SECTION 30040) STORAGE PROHIBITION AS
APPLIED TO MIXED WASTES: EDISON
ELECTRIC INSTITUTE V. EPA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 1 directs the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to promulgate rules and treatment standards for the safe land disposal2 of particular hazardous wastes. 3 Congress established a series of Land Disposal Restrictions ("LDRs") to insure that
hazardous wastes would be adequately treated before land disposal
could be employed. 4 The LDRs mandate that if, after a period of
time determined by Congress, EPA fails to establish treatment stan1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") §§ 3001-5006,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress added RCRA as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 ("SWDA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Congress enacted RCRA in an effort to establish a complete program for the regulation of hazardous waste. Barbara A. Finamore, Regulating Hazardous and Mixed Waste at Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Facilities:
Reversing Decades of Environmental Neglect, 9 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 83, 92 (1985).

Former congressman and governor of New Jersey James Florio described the
statute:

RCRA created a 'cradle to grave' regulatory system for hazardous
waste, requiring generators, transporters, and disposers to maintain written records of waste transfers, and establishing standards, procedures,
and permit requirements for disposal ....
. Key provisions required EPA to develop standards for facilities
handling hazardous waste, to establish a system of permits for such facilities, and to determine the technology appropriate for the disposal of particular wastes.
JamesJ. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3
YALEJ. ON REG. 351, 353, 358 (1986) (citations omitted); see alsoJames 0. Neet, Jr.,
Hazardous Waste Regulation in the United States: A Mind-Numbing Journey, J. KAN. B.
Ass'N, Jan. 1992, at 31.

2. The RCRA definition of "land disposal" includes, but is not limited to "any
placement of such hazardous waste in a landfill, surface impoundment, waste pile,
injection well, land treatment facility, salt dome formation, or underground mine
or cave." RCRA § 3004(k), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(k).
3. A wastes is considered "hazardous" if it possesses one of four characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity and toxicity, or if it has been deemed "hazardous" through EPA regulations. Chemical Waste Management v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 976 F.2d 2,8 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1961
(1993); 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1993).
4. For a discussion of Land Disposal Restrictions ("LDRs"), see LisA K. FRiEDMAN ET AL., SUPERFUND LDR GUIDFs 163, 165 (1990).
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dards for a particular type of waste, land disposal of that waste is
forbidden. 5 In addition, RCRA section 30040) forbids storage of
wastes prohibited from land disposal, unless such storage is solely
for the purpose of accumulating sufficient amounts of waste for
proper recovery, treatment or disposal. 6 Thus, waste handlers may
be put in quite a predicament: if their wastes are prohibited from
land disposal by LDRs due to a lack of treatment options, then storage of those wastes would also be illegal.
When EPA fails to establish treatment standards for LDR waste
because of a lack of treatment capacity or technology, the Agency is
presented with an enforcement policy problem. On the one hand,
storage is expressly forbidden by RCRA. 7 On the other hand, lack
of treatment technology or capacity makes storage the only available option for most generators and storers of restricted wastes. 8
Clearly, when both disposal and storage of existing wastes are forbidden under RCRA, EPA must try to strike a balance between the
statutory language and the interests of handlers of the prohibited
wastes.
In 1991, EPA addressed the problem of section 3004(j)'s application to "mixed wastes," 9 in a statement titled Policy on Enforcement of RCRA Section 30040) Storage Prohibition at Facilities
Generating Mixed Radioactive/Hazardous Wastes ("Section 3004(j)
Enforcement Policy Statement"). 10 In this statement, EPA announced that the storage of mixed wastes, pending development of
5. RCRA § 3004(g) (6) (A)-(C), 42 U.S.C. §

69

24(g) (6) (A)-(C).

6. RCRA § 30040) provides:

In the case of any hazardous waste which is prohibited from one or more
methods of land disposal under this section (or under regulations
promulgated by the Administrator under any provision of this section)
the storage of such hazardous waste is prohibited unless such storage is
solely for the purpose of the accumulation of such quantities of such hazardous waste as are necessary to facilitate proper recovery, treatment or
disposal.
Id. § 3004(j), 42 U.S.C. § 69240).
7. Id.
8. See Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, infra note 10. at 42,732
(discussing difficulty of enforcing ban on storage of wastes for which disposal technology or capacity has not yet been developed).
9. "Mixed wastes" are wastes containing both a hazardous waste component
regulated under RCRA and a radioactive waste component regulated under the
Atomic Energy Act ("AEA"). Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir.
1993). EPA maintains that under RCRA, the land disposal and indefinite storage
of insufficiently treated mixed wastes is forbidden. See generally Section 3004(j)
Enforcement Policy Statement, infra note 10, at 42,730.
10. See Policy on Enforcement of RCRA Section 3004(U) Storage Prohibition
at Facilities Generating Mixed Radioactive/Hazardous Wastes, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,730
(1991) [hereinafter Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement].
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sufficient treatment or disposal capacity, was not permitted under
RCRA section 3004(). t1 As a result, EPA recognized that the lack
of available treatment and disposal options made it impossible for
generators and storers of mixed wastes to comply with the storage
prohibition of section 30040). 12 Keeping in mind that the prohibition on both treatment and storage forced mixed waste generators
to break the law, EPA announced its enforcement policy for the
section 3004(j) storage prohibition: for those mixed waste handlers
who store "relatively small volumes" of mixed waste in an "environmentally responsible manner," violations of section 30040) would
be considered "reduced priorities among EPA's potential civil enforcement actions."' 13 EPA originally indicated that its section
4
3004(0) Enforcement Policy would expire on December 31, 1993.'
However, on April 20, 1994, EPA renewed its original policy, with
15
some modifications, for an additional two years.
In Edison Electric Institute v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency,' 6 a group of utilities and power companies ("the Institute")
petitioned for review of EPA's interpretation of the section 3004(j)
storage prohibition. The Institute contended that EPA's Section
30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, which outlined how the
Agency would enforce the storage prohibition against generators
and storers of mixed wastes, was impossible to comply with and inconsistent with the statute.' 7 EPA first responded with several arguments against the Institute's standing to bring suit.' 8

EPA then

argued that its interpretation of section 3004(0) was consistent with
congressional intent.' 9 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
11. Id. at 42,732; see also RCRA § 3004(j), 42 U.S.C. § 69240).
12. Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,732.
13. Id. at 42,731. A "relatively small volume" is defined in the Section 30040)
Enforcement Policy Statement as less than 1000 cubic feet per year of mixed
wastes. Id. EPA indicated that its primary enforcement concern would be with
larger generators (greater than 1000 cubic feet per year): "EPA believes that the
1,000 cubic feet/yr amount will exclude from this policy only about 5% of the total
number of mixed waste generators. However, the large generator facilities excluded by this amount may account for about 96% of the volume of LDR prohibited mixed wastes." Id. at 42,733.
14. Id. at 42,731.
15. Extension of the Policy on Enforcement of RCRA Section 3004(J) Storage
Prohibition at Facilities Generating Mixed Radioactive/Hazardous Waste, 59 Fed.
Reg. 18,813 (1994) [hereinafter Extension of Section 30040) Enforcement Policy
Statement].
16. 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
17. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 328.

18. For a discussion of the court's analysis of preliminary issues raised by EPA,
see infra note 76.
19. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 331-37.
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Appeals held that EPA's interpretation of section 3004(j) was not
only correct, but mandated by the statute, and that the Enforce20
ment Policy was within EPA's power to effectuate.
This Note will examine the legal precedents and regulatory efforts of EPA with respect to section 3004(j). It will also analyze the
District of Columbia Circuit's discussion of the merits of the Institute's claims, focusing on the court's analysis of the arguments that
EPA's interpretation of section 3004(j) and its section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement are impossible to comply with and inconsistent with the statute. Finally, this Note will suggest that, while
the court was correct in its analysis and conclusions, EPA should
consider altering its "hands off" enforcement policy 2 ' because it
leaves a conditional storage option open to generators and storers
of mixed wastes, 22 and is inadequate to accomplish Congress' objectives in enacting section 3004(j).

II.
A.

23

BACKGROUND

Analytical Framework and Applicable Precedents
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,

Inc.,2 4

the United States Supreme Court held that when a court reviews an executive agency's interpretation of a statute which it is
charged with administering, the court must undertake a two-part
analysis.2 5 First, the court must determine whether Congress has
directly addressed the precise question at issue. 26 To answer this
question, the court should look to the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language, as well as the structure of the statute as a
whole. 2 7 If the court can clearly discern Congress' intent from the
statute, the analysis is complete.2 8 The court and administering
agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
20. Id. at 335-37.
21. For an explanation of this "hands-off" policy, see infra notes 66-74 and
accompanying text.
22. For an examination of this conditional storage option and the criteria
used by EPA in determining whether to enforce § 3004(j) against a facility operator, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
23. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 357 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (1990). For a discussion of Congress' goals in
enacting RCRA § 3004(j), see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
25. Id. at 842-43.
26. Id. at 842.
27. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
28. Id.
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Congress." 29 In a case where the court determines that Congress
has not clearly expressed its intent, the court must undertake step
two of the analysis. Instead of simply adopting its own interpretation of the statute, the court must determine whether the agency's
interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute."30

The Court noted that considerable weight should be accorded
to an administering agency's interpretation of a statute it is entrusted with enforcing.3 1 Specifically, the Chevron Court held that
where an agency's interpretation "represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies" advanced by the statute, courts
should not disturb that interpretation unless it appears, from legislative history or the statute itself, "that the accommodation is not
32
one that Congress would have sanctioned."
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa

Ana, 33 the Supreme Court held that lower courts should follow the
"elementary canon" of statutory construction that a statute should
34
not be interpreted in a way which renders one part inoperative.
However, the Court has also held that interpretations of a statute
which produce absurd or impossible results should be avoided, provided that an alternative interpretation is available that would be
35
consistent with legislative intent.
In interpreting ambiguous statutes, courts have often looked to
legislative history for guidance. Even so, in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,36 the Supreme Court held that

while legislative history is a valuable guide to statutory interpretation, the language of a statute governs unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary. 37 Thus, in the absence
29. Cheron, 467 U.S. at 842.
30. Id. at 842-43.
31. Id. at 843-44. This degree of deference is accorded to administrative interpretations because of their unique expertise and experience. Id. at 844-45.
32. Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
33. 472 U.S. 237 (1985).
34. Id. at 249.
35. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). Despite
the Supreme Court's policy, where the intent of Congress is clear from the language of the statute, the Court has not avoided potentially absurd interpretations.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Asphalt Products Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121
(1987), the Court held that "[U]udicial perception that a particular result would be
unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot
justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided."
36. 481 U.S. 454 (1987).
37. Id. at 461.
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of extraordinary circumstances, if a court finds "the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." 38
B.

The RCRA Section 3004(j) Storage Prohibition

In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments ("HSWA") to RCRA. 39 The HSWA provisions give
EPA significant authority to regulate the land disposal of hazardous
wastes. 40 The HSWA storage prohibition, RCRA section 3004(j),
limits the storage of wastes barred from land disposal. 4 1 This section provides that where land disposal is prohibited for a particular
hazardous waste under the LDRs, storage of that waste is prohibited
unless such storage is solely for the purpose of accumulating sufficient quantities of hazardous waste to facilitate proper recovery,
42
treatment or disposal.
In Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 43 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Congress enacted
RCRA section 3004(j) because it believed that storage of hazardous
waste "as a means of forestalling required treatment" created health
threats as serious as those posed by land disposal itself.44 Thus, in

enacting RCRA, Congress instituted a regulatory scheme whereby
generators and storers of hazardous wastes would be forced to
45
properly treat their wastes rather than employ indefinite storage.
Beginning in 1986, EPA was required to promulgate regulations which would phase out the land disposal of various wastes
38. Id. (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
39. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"), Pub. L. No.
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see generally Chemical Waste Management v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 976 F.2d 2, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1961 (1993). For
purposes of this Note, references to RCRA include HSWA.

40. "The statute expressed a general policy preference that 'reliance on land
disposal should be minimized or eliminated.'" Chemical Waste Management, 976
F.2d at 8 (quoting SWDA § 1002(b)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(7)). Through the
Amendments, Congress sought to minimize potential harm to human health and
the environment by requiring the treatment of hazardous wastes before their land
disposal. SeeJudith M. Nixon, Comment, The Problem with RCRA - Do the Financial
Responsibility Provisions Really Wor*?, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 133, 141-43 (1986).
41. RCRA § 3004(j), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(j). For the text of RCRA § 3004(j), see
supra note 6.
42. RCRA § 30040), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(j).
43. 886 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 357. Congress wanted to remove the availability of a storage option
which might allow generators or storers to avoid restrictions on land disposal by
means of indefinite storage. Id.
45. Id.
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based on a schedule contained in HSWA. 46 The land disposal of
hazardous wastes containing solvents and dioxins was prohibited after November 8, 1986. 4 7 Additionally, another group of hazardous

wastes ("California list" wastes) were barred from land disposal after
July 8, 1987.48 EPA ranked the remaining wastes based on their

potential hazards, and divided them into three groups: First-Third,
Second-Third and Third-Third. 49 EPA was then charged with
promulgating final disposal regulations for each group. 50
Mixed wastes were included in the Third-Third of EPA's rankings. 5 ' Congress prohibited the land disposal of Third-Third wastes

unless EPA promulgated treatment regulations for them by May 8,
1990.52
46. Chemical Waste Management v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
976 F.2d 2, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1961 (1993).
47. Id.; see RCRA § 3004(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)(1).
48. Chemical Waste Management, 976 F.2d at 8; see RCRA § 3004(d), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(d). "California list" wastes are so named because the State of California
developed regulations restricting the land disposal of wastes containing certain ingredients, including: "free cyanides, certain metals, corrosive wastes, PCBs, and
HOCs. (HOCs are compounds containing carbon and a halogen, such as fluorine,
chlorine, bromine, iodine, and astatine, in their molecular formula)." FRIEDMAN
ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 169.

49. Chemical Waste Management, 976 F.2d at 8. The wastes with the highest
toxicity and volume were placed in the First-Third. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 166.
50. Under RCRA, the Administrator must:
promulgate regulations specifying those levels or methods of treatment, if
any, which substantially diminish the toxicity of the waste or substantially
reduce the likelihood of migration of hazardous constituents from the
waste so that short-term and long-term threats to human health and the
environment are minimized.
RCRA § 3004 (m) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (m) (1). A generator/storer who complied
with EPA treatment standards would then be allowed to employ land disposal of
the wastes. Id. § 3004(m) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(2). To permit land disposal of
hazardous wastes under HSWA, EPA's treatment regulations must:
prohibit[ ] one or more methods of land disposal of the hazardous wastes
listed . . . except for methods of land disposal which the Administrator
determines will be protective of human health and the environment for
as long as the waste remains hazardous. . . . For the purposes of this
paragraph, a method of land disposal may not be determined to be protective of human health and the environment... unless.., it has been
demonstrated to the Administrator, to a reasonable degree of certainty,
that there will be no migration of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the wastes remain hazardous.
Id. § 3 0 0 4(g) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 6 9 2 4 (g) (5).
51. Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,732.
For a definition of mixed wastes, see supra note 9.
52. Chemical Waste Management, 976 F.2d at 8; see RCRA § 3 0 0 4(g), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924(g).
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Regulatory Action Regarding the RCRA Section 30040)
Storage Prohibition as Applied to Mixed Wastes
The series of EPA regulations dealing with the implementation

of RCRA section 3004(j) began in 1986. 5 3 These initial regulations,

closely following the statutory language, provided that generators
were only permitted to employ on-site storage of LDR hazardous
waste to accumulate such quantities of waste as necessary to facilitate proper recovery, treatment or disposal. 5 4 Under these regulations, EPA used a temporal test to determine whether storage was
proper.5 5 Generally, if storage of LDR hazardous waste was utilized
for more than one year, EPA placed the burden on the owner/
operator of the facility to prove that such storage was necessary to
56
facilitate proper recovery, treatment or disposal.
In November 1989, EPA invited comments on its section
3004(j) regulatory scheme. 5 7 While noting that the section was intended to prohibit use of long-term storage to avoid treatment requirements imposed by the LDRs, EPA recognized that "[v]irtually
no storage except that undertaken to promote under-utilized
proper management capacity would satisfy [a] literal reading of"
section 3004(j).

58

Thus, EPA sought comments to determine

53. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 329; see Hazardous Waste Management System;
Land Disposal Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,572, 40,579, 40,642-43 (1986).

RCRA

§ 30040j) presents a number of problems not only to generators and storers of
mixed wastes, but also to federal regulatory agencies. The hybrid nature of mixed
wastes, part radioactive and part hazardous, has led to confusion over which federal agencies have regulatory power over them. In New Mexico v. Watkins, 969
F.2d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA's
determination that its RCRA regulations applied to mixed wastes. See State Authorization To Regulate the Hazardous Components of Radioactive Mixed Wastes
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,504 (1986)
(announcing that "EPA has now determined that wastes containing both hazardous waste and radioactive waste are subject to... RCRA regulation"). For a general
background of the early conflict between EPA and the Department of Energy over
whether EPA could regulate mixed wastes, see Finamore, supra note 1.
54. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 329 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 268.50(a)(1) (1992)).
55. Id.
56. This scheme allowed storage for up to one year unless EPA could demonstrate that such storage was not solely for proper recovery, treatment or disposal of
the waste. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 286.50(b)). After one year of storage, the burden
shifted to the owner/operator of the facility to prove that such storage was necessary to facilitate proper recovery, treatment or disposal. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 286.50(c)). This burden-shifting scheme was upheld in Hazardous Waste Treatment Counci4 886 F.2d at 366-68.
57. See Land Disposal Restrictions for Third Scheduled Wastes, 54 Fed. Reg.
48,372, 48,496 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 148, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271)
(proposed Nov. 22, 1989) [hereinafter Proposed Third-Third LDRs].
58. Id.
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whether a literal reading of section 3004j) would prohibit legiti59
mate storage or have other unintended consequences.
On June 1, 1990, EPA announced that it had decided not to
reinterpret the section 30040) storage provision. 60 At the same
time, EPA issued final disposal regulations for Third-Third wastes. 6 '
However, due to the lack of available treatment technology and capacity for mixed wastes, such wastes were still effectively prohibited
from land disposal. 62 Thus, EPA took the position that through operation of section 3004(j), the storage of inadequately treated
63
mixed wastes also remained prohibited.
While EPA rejected a comprehensive revision of its regulations,
it recognized the difficulties faced by generators of mixed wastes
64
because of the lack of available disposal or treatment capacity.
59. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 330; Proposed Third-Third LDRs, supranote 57, at
48,496.
60. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 330; see Land Disposal Restrictions for Third Third
Scheduled Wastes, 55 Fed. Reg. 22,520, 22,534 (1990) [hereinafter Third-Third
LDRs]. In announcing its determination not to revise 40 C.F.R. § 286.50, EPA
announced that "[tihe Agency continues to believe . . . that the statutory prohibition was designed to prevent the use of storage as a means of avoiding a treatment
standard, and will continue to enforce the storage prohibition with that intention
in mind." Third-Third LDRs, supra, at 22,534.
61. See Third-Third LDRs, supra note 60, at 22,534.
62. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 330-31; see also Section 30040) Enforcement Policy
Statement, supra note 10, at 42,732. As of April 20, 1994, EPA knew of only four
companies that possessed the technology to treat mixed wastes: Diversified Scientific Services, Inc., NSSI Recovery Services, Inc., Quadrex Corp., and RAMP Industries. At the same time, EPA could only identify one company, Envirocare of Utah,
Inc., that provided disposal capacity for certain types of commercially generated
mixed waste. Extension of Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra
note 15, at 18,813-14.
63. See Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at
42,731-33.
64. Third-Third LDRs, supra note 60, at 22,534. "EPA is aware of the difficulties posed by the applicability of the section 30040) storage prohibition to mixed
(radioactive/hazardous) wastes, as there is little disposal or treatment capacity
available." Id. Mixed wastes are generated by a number of facilities crucial to modern life, including nuclear power plants, universities, hospitals and industrial facilities. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 329. Electric utilities generate about 10% of the
140,000 cubic feet of mixed wastes produced in the U.S. each year. Mary
O'Driscoll, Court Backs EPA In RCRA Dispute With EEI,ENERGY DALY, June 28, 1993.
In its Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, EPA noted that strict enforcement of the RCRA land disposal and storage prohibitions "could result in the cessation of such activities as facility and environmental monitoring with radioisotope
levels, pharmaceutical manufacturing and testing, diagnostic testing, nuclear
medicine, and the manufacture of the sealed sources and radioisotope formulation used in connection with the aforementioned activities." Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,733. Thus, strict enforcement of
the section 30040) storage prohibition would not just affect industrial waste handlers, but might also affect important consumer services such as health care and
energy production.
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EPA stated that it would further investigate the legal, policy and
factual issues relevant to mixed wastes and would later issue an en65
forcement policy addressing the mixed waste problem.
D.

EPA's Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement

On August 29, 1991, EPA issued its section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement regarding the storage of mixed wastes. 6 , In
its statement, EPA observed that the specific problem with commercially generated mixed wastes was that there were no facilities in the
United States providing disposal capacity. 67 In addition, there were

limited treatment options for most commercially-generated mixed
wastes. 68 As a result, EPA acknowledged that commercial mixed
waste generators' only option, short of ceasing operations or engaging in illegal disposal, was to violate the storage prohibition.6 9 EPA
recognized the implications of strict enforcement of section
3004(0), noting that it might "result in the cessation of such activities as facility and environmental monitoring . . .pharmaceutical

manufacturing and testing, diagnostic testing, nuclear medicine,"
and the manufacture of other items used in these activities.11 With
these considerations in mind, EPA issued its enforcement policy:
For those mixed waste generators who are operating their
storage facilities in an environmentally responsible manner as described in this policy, EPA considers the violations of section 30040) involving relatively small volumes
of waste to be reduced priorities among EPA's potential
civil enforcement actions. Any enforcement activity arising from violations of section 3004(j) at these facilities will
generally focus on determining whether these generators
are managing their mixed wastes in an environmentally re71
sponsible manner.
EPA also indicated what factors it would weigh in determining
whether a facility was operating "in an environmentally responsible
65. Third-Third LDRs, supra note 60, at 22,534. The result of EPA's further

evaluation of the issues surrounding mixed wastes was the Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10. For a discussion of this enforcement policy.
see infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
66. Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10.
67. Id. at 42,732.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 42,733.
70. Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,733.
71. Id. at 42,731.
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manner."72 The Agency would look to whether the generator main-

tained proper inventory records and identification of mixed wastes,
whether a facility had developed a waste minimization plan,
whether the generator had made a good faith attempt at compliance with RCRA and whether the generator cooperated with EPA
73
information-gathering efforts.
While EPA maintained that violations of section 3004 0 ) by
mixed waste handlers would receive reduced enforcement priority,

the Agency stressed that it would attach a higher enforcement priority if facility inspections turned up significant RCRA violations,

(other than section 3004(j) violations), or a pattern of violations
which showed disregard for compliance with RCRA hazardous
74
waste regulations.
III.

THE DISTICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF
INTERPRETATION OF

RCRA

SECTION

EPA's

30040)

The issue in Edison Electric was whether the RCRA section

30040) storage restriction permitted the indefinite storage of
mixed wastes pending development of sufficient treatment and dis-

posal capacity. 75 After rejecting EPA's procedural challenges to the
72. Id.
73. Id. at 42,733-34. EPA outlined the manner in which it would examine
these factors:
EPA will consider a variety of indicators of environmentally responsible
operation in determining the civil enforcement priority of section
3004(j) storage violations at particular mixed waste generator facilities.
These indicators include, but are not limited to:
-Whether the facility has conducted an inventory of its mixed waste
storage areas to assess and assure its compliance with all other applicable
RCRA storage facility standards,
-Whether the facility has identified and kept records of its mixed
wastes, including sources, waste codes, generation rates and volumes in
storage,
-Whether the facility has developed a mixed waste minimization
plan, or can demonstrate (through documentation) that waste minimization is not technically feasible for its wastes,
-Whether the facility can document periodically that it has made
good faith efforts to ascertain the availability of treatment capacity for its
mixed wastes,
-Whether the facility (if contacted in connection with the ongoing
joint EPA/NRC profile of mixed waste generators) has cooperated with
the Agencies in providing complete and accurate information about their
mixed wastes upon request.
Id. at 42,731.
74. Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,731.
75. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 328.
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Institute's action, 76 the court examined the merits of the Institute's
claim that EPA's interpretation of RCRA 3004 0 ) and its Section
30040) Enforcement Policy Statement were impossible to comply
with and inconsistent with the statute. 77 The court began its analy76. Before addressing the merits, the court examined and rejected several
procedural arguments raised by EPA in seeking to have the petition for review
dismissed. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 331-34.
EPA first argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Institute failed
to file a petition for review within 90 days of the original 1986 regulations. Id. at
331; see also supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1986
regulations. In support of this proposition, EPA relied on Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In Natural Resources, the court held that a statutory 60-day period for seeking judicial review, similar to the 90-day period provided by RCRA, was jurisdictional in
nature and could not be altered by the courts. Id. at 602. The Edison Electric court
rejected this argument, relying instead upon the "reopener doctrine" articulated
in Association of American Railroads v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 846
F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and Ohio v. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In
Ohio, the court held that "the period for seeking judicial review may be made to
run anew when the agency in question by some new promulgation creates the
opportunity for renewed comment and objection." 838 F.2d at 1328. In Edison
Electric, EPA had previously sought comment on alternative enforcement schemes
for RCRA § 30040) in 1989. Thus, the court held that "[b]y soliciting comments
on the existing section 30040) regulations .. .EPA clearly provided the type of
'opportunity for renewed comment and objection' that suffices to restart the statutory period for seeking review." Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 332.
Secondly, EPA argued that its Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement
was immune from review under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Heckler, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that "an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency's absolute discretion." Id. at 831. Thus, the Court held
that such decisions are "presumptively unreviewable" under the Administrative
Procedures Act. Id. at 832-33. The Edison Electric court rejected EPA's Heckler argument, noting that the Institute was challenging EPA's interpretation of § 3004(j)
and its implementing regulations, not the priority which was being placed upon
enforcement. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333. The court observed that the Section
30040) Enforcement Policy Statement deals with "the substantive requirements of
the law; it is not the type of discretionary judgment concerning the allocation of
enforcement resources that Heckler shields from judicial review." Edison Elec., 996
F.2d at 333.
Finally, the court also rejected EPA's argument that the dispute was not ripe
for review, utilizing the two-part "ripeness" test of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.
387 U.S. 136 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99
(1977). In Abbott Labs, the Supreme Court held that in determining whether an
issue was ripe for review, courts must evaluate "both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id. at 149. In Edison Electric, the court found the first prong of this test
satisfied because the Institute was making a wholly legal challenge to EPA's Section
30040) Enforcement Policy Statement, which would apply to a large number of
mixed waste handlers, "all of whom share a common problem - a severe shortage
of adequate treatment and disposal capacity." Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 333-34. The
court decided that since the petition for review was timely and there were no institutional interests leaning against review, it was unnecessary to inquire further as to
ripeness. Id. at 334.
77. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 334-37.
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sis of EPA's interpretation of section 30040) under the two-part test
78
of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Under Chevron, a reviewing court must determine whether Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue.7 9 The
D.C. Circuit recognized that even if it found ambiguity in section
3004(j), the court would have to uphold EPA's interpretation as
long as it was a permissible construction of the statute.8 0
The court agreed with EPA that Congress had spoken to the
precise question at issue, and held that section 3004(j) could not be
read to sanction the indefinite storage of mixed wastes while treatment methods or disposal capacity were developed. 8 1 The court
explained that section 30040) "authorizes storage only when it is
intended to build up an amount of waste that can be readily transported, treated, or disposed - as, for example, when storage is
used to meet minimum volume requirements imposed by waste
transporters or treatment facilities." 2 In arriving at its conclusion,
the court rejected each of the Institute's arguments that section
3004(j) authorized the indefinite storage of mixed wastes.
A.

Statutory Purpose

The first argument rejected by the court was the Institute's alternative reading of section 3004(j), which suggested that Congress
meant to allow storage where adequate treatment or disposal methods do not exist, because the real purpose of RCRA was to "prevent
land disposal of untreated wastes."8 3 In rejecting this argument the
court looked to the overall design and purpose of RCRA. 84 First,
the court noted that RCRA's purpose was not only to proscribe land
disposal of untreated wastes, but also to promote a "treat as you go"
regulatory regime.8 5 Second, the Edison court observed that RCRA
includes explicit provisions giving EPA the power to grant national
capacity variances, which can delay the implementation of LDRs for
up to two years, to deal with the problem of inadequate treatment
facilities for certain wastes.8 6 The court observed that this "weighs
78. Id. at 334 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45). For a discussion of the
Chevron test, see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
79. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 334 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842).

80. Id.
81. Id. at 334-35.
82. Id. at 335.
83. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 335.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 335-36 (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 886 F.2d at 357).
86. Id. See RCRA § 3004(h)(2),(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(h)(2),(3).
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heavily against a reading of section 30040) that would permit storage to become an alternative avenue for dealing with such
shortages."8 7 Finally, the court viewed EPA's interpretation of section 3004(j) to be consistent with RCRA's purpose as a "highly prescriptive, technology-forcing statute." 88 The court noted that RCRA
was designed to provide "draconian" incentives to speed the development of alternative treatment and disposal technology. 89 The
court recognized that these incentives would be significantly diminished if generators could rely on indefinite storage in the event that
capacity had not developed to treat or dispose of particular
wastes. 90 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA's interpretation of
section 3004(0) was consistent with Congress' intent in enacting
RCRA. 9 1
B.

Impossibility

The Institute argued that EPA's interpretation of section
30040) imposed requirements that were impossible to meet, and
that statutory constructions which lead to impossible results should
be avoided. 92 However, the court rejected the Institute's impossibility argument on two grounds. 93 First, addressing the statute's technology-advancing purpose, the court suggested that the reason
treatment was presently impossible was that sufficient resources
were not directed towards developing required treatment methods
beginning in 1986, when it was held that RCRA applied to mixed
wastes. 9 4 Second, even if sufficient efforts had not produced technological advances and proper treatment remained impossible,
"courts have not shrunk from adopting onerous interpretations of
statutory provisions where required by the clear intent of
95
Congress.,
87. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 335.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 337.
92. Id. at 336. The Institute argued that even if mixed waste generators
ceased all operations (which would cause major economic disruptions) they would
still be in violation of section 30040) due to mixed wastes already generated, and
those that would be generated in the shutdown process. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. See New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d at 1132 (deferring to EPA's deter-

mination that RCRA storage/disposal regulations apply to mixed wastes).
95. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 336. The court highlighted two cases in which the
Supreme Court affirmed "absurd" interpretations of statutes on the basis that the
interpretations were mandated by congressional intent. Id. (citing Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v Asphalt Products, 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987); Griffin v.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol6/iss1/8
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Legislative History

The Institute also argued that the legislative history of section
30040) indicated that the section was only intended to prevent
"sham" storage, used only to avoid the prohibition on land disposal. 96 The Institute cited language from congressional floor debates

to support this interpretation. 97 However, in addition to finding
persuasive legislative history to the contrary, 98 the court applied the
principle of Burlington Northern9 and stated that unless exceptional
circumstances demand otherwise, when the terms employed by a
statute are unambiguous, 'judicial inquiry is complete."10 0 The
court ruled that the Institute's "lone snippet" from the bill's floor
101
debates hardly constituted an "exceptional circumstance."
D.

Conflict with the Atomic Energy Act

The Institute also argued that EPA's interpretation of section
30040) directly conflicted with RCRA section 1006(a), which prevents giving effect to RCRA sections in a way that is inconsistent
with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA").1 0 2 Generally, the Institute argued that EPA's interpretation of section
30040) interfered with the AEA's primary purpose of promoting
the use and development of nuclear power.10 3 In rejecting this arOceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)). Accordingly, the court in
Edison Electric held that because Congress' intent in enacting § 30040) was clear,
the court was obligated to enforce the statute, no matter how onerous the burden
it created. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 336.
96. Id.
97. Id. The Institute specifically relied upon the statement of Representative
Breaux, a sponsor of what became RCRA § 30040):
The purpose of this amendment is to avoid the potential problem of
waste generators, handlers or disposers utilizing "sham" storage to avoid a
prohibition on the disposal of a particular waste from one or more methods of land disposal.
129 CONG. Ri:c. 27,660, 27,666 (1983) (statement of Rep. Breaux).
98. The court noted the statement of Representative Forsythe, who worked
closely with Representative Breaux on the bill: "Storage based only on some vague
hope for a future development of appropriate treatment is no longer acceptable."
129 CONG. REc. 27,669 (1983) (statement of Rep. Forsythe).
99. For a discussion of Burlington Northern,see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
100. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 336 (quoting Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 461;
Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 337. RCRA § 1006(a) states, in relevant part: "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply to ... any activity or substance which is subject
to . . . the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.] except to the
extent that such application (or regulation) is not inconsistent with the requirements of such Act[ ]." RCRA § 1006(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6005(a).
103. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 337.
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gument, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Supreme Court's warning that "the promotion of nuclear power is
not to be accomplished 'at all costs.' "104 Furthermore, the court
recognized that burdens such as the ones imposed on mixed waste
generators by section 30040) are to be expected in the multi-faceted regulatory scheme which controls mixed wastes. 10 5
E.

Ambiguity

The Institute's final argument focused on EPA's 1989 request
for commentary on the enforcement of section 30040).106 The
Institute alleged that because EPA offered to consider alternative
interpretations of section 3004(j), the Agency implicitly acknowledged that the statute was ambiguous. 10 7 The court held that while
EPA had solicited comments on alternative enforcement schemes,
the Agency never contemplated allowing indefinite storage of
mixed wastes pending development of adequate treatment capacity
or disposal technology.1 08 The court maintained that EPA's
goal was merely to elicit a sampling of alternative enforcement
proposals. 109
F.

The D.C. Circuit's Holding

After rejecting all of the Institute's arguments, the court denied its petition for review of EPA's interpretation of section
30040). 110 The court held that, on its face, section 3004 0 ) clearly
forbids the indefinite storage of land-disposal restricted wastes
pending development of adequate treatment and disposal technology, thus satisfying the first step of the Chevron test.1 1 '
In issuing its holding, the court expressed its sympathy for
mixed waste generators, who would have no choice but to violate
section 30040) and face potential liability. Even so, the court
stated:
104. Id. (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 222 (1983), modified on other grounds, English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)).
105. Id.
106. Id. For a discussion of EPA's request for comments on its interpretation

of § 3004(j), see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
107. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 337.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 337. For a discussion of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Chevron test, see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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[T] he possibility that such hardships will occur is inherent
in statutes such as RCRA that are expressly designed to
force technology by threatening extreme sanctions. Moreover, the fact that technology may not be able to keep up
with timetables established by Congress does not mean
that courts are at liberty to ignore them, however burdensome the resulting enforcement. Accordingly, if petitioners are to obtain relief from their present predicament,
12
that relief must come from Congress.

IV.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

It is difficult to criticize the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals for denying the Institute's petition for review. The court
had to determine the validity of EPA's interpretation of section
3004(j) and its implementing regulations. This only required the
application of well-settled principles of administrative law and statutory construction. On the other hand, the Institute's challenge to
EPA's interpretation of section 30040) was certainly not frivolous.
The fact that there are few legal treatment or disposal options for
mixed waste handlers gives credence to the Institute's claim that
EPA's interpretation was unreasonable.'1 3 Even so, the court properly concluded that EPA's interpretation of the storage provision
was consistent with congressional intent, thereby satisfying the first
114
step of the Chevron test:
Under the Supreme Court's Chevron test, if the reviewing court
finds that congressional intent is clear from the statute, both the
court and the enforcing agency are bound to give effect to that intent.' 15 In Edison Electric, the court properly held that the language
of section 3004(j), the structure of RCRA as a whole, and the legislative history of the section all showed that Congress clearly intended to eradicate the storage of wastes prohibited from land
112. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 337. Here, the court concluded by quoting Justice George Sutherland in Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930): "Laws enacted with good intention, when put to the test, frequently . . . turn out to be
mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable. But in such case the remedy lies
with the law making authority, and not with the courts." Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at
337.
113. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 328.

114. Id. at 336. For a discussion of the congressional intent behind RCRA
§ 3004(j), see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
115. Cheuron, 467 U.S. at 842. For a discussion of Chevron, see supranotes 2432 and accompanying text.
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disposal.1 1 6 As the court observed, RCRA was designed in part to
provide "draconian" incentives to foster the development of new
11 7
treatment technology and capacity.
The language of section 30040) acts as a stringent prohibition
on the indefinite storage of wastes banned from land disposal, and
has been interpreted as such by EPA since 1986.118 Viewing the
statute as a whole, RCRA provides for national capacity variances
designed to remedy situations where EPA has failed to promulgate
treatment standards or where capacity does not yet exist.' 19 As the
court noted, the fact that Congress has provided a separate statutory mechanism for dealing with the problem of inadequate treatment capacity weighs heavily against any reading of section 30040)
that would permit storage as an alternative to dealing with treat120
ment capacity shortages.
Further, the court accurately examined the Institute's legislative history argument. The Institute argued that legislative history
indicated section 3004(j) was designed only to prevent "sham storage." 12 1 The court answered this contention with the well-settled
principle that where the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judi122
cial inquiry is complete.
Even if the court had determined that Congress did not speak
to the precise question at issue (thus not fulfilling the first part of
the Chevron test), the result would certainly have been the same.
The court would have continued its analysis to the second part of
the Chevron test to determine whether EPA's interpretation represented "a permissible construction of the statute." 123 Under this
more forgiving standard, an analysis of the same factors that led the
court to its ultimate conclusions would have rendered the same result: that EPA's interpretation of section 30040) was consistent with
congressional intent.
116. For the language of RCRA § 3004 0), see supra note 6. For a discussion
of the purpose of RCRA, see generally Florio, supra note 1.
117. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 335; see generally Florio, supra note 1.
118. For the language of RCRA § 3004(j), see supra note 6. For EPA's past
regulatory efforts in enforcing the § 3004 0 ) storage prohibition, see supra notes
53-65 and accompanying text.
119. See Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 335; Section 30040) Enforcement Policy
Statement, supra note 10, at 42,732.
120. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 335.
121. Id. at 336; see also supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text, which discusses the Institute's claim that the legislative history of § 3004 0 ) indicates that the
section was designed to prevent only "sham" storage.
122. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 336; see also K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291.
123. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 334 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
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V.

IMPACT OF

EPA's

ENFORCEMENT POLICY

Clearly, the problem that Edison Electric presents does not lie in
the court's analysis of the validity of EPA's interpretation of section
30040). Rather, the problem lies in the enforcement policy EPA
has adopted to fulfill the congressional intent behind the section as
applied to mixed waste handlers.
In formulating its Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, EPA had to strike a balance between the prohibition of
mixed waste storage called for by RCRA section 3004(j) and the
virtual impossibility of compliance by mixed waste handlers due to
the lack of treatment capacity.1 24 Unfortunately, in trying to strike
this balance, EPA adopted a policy that is simply not a sufficient
mechanism to fulfill Congress' intent as stated in section 30040).125
The most glaring problem with EPA's Section 30040) Enforcement Policy Statement is that it creates an inconsistent system for
enforcing the storage prohibition. At first glance, it would appear
that generators would favor EPA's enforcement policy, because of
the low priority it attaches to civil enforcement of RCRA.126 However, the policy only applies to "small" (less than 1000 cubic feet per
year) generators of mixed waste. 127 Thus, the policy leaves largescale generators of mixed waste exposed to the possibility of stricter
enforcement. In addition, the policy leaves both large and small
generators exposed to potential private actions by citizens, and to
124. For a discussion of the difficulties surrounding the treatment or disposal
of mixed wastes, see supra notes 62, 64.

125. EPA has chosen to pursue an enforcement mechanism similar to that
used in most states' "seat belt" laws. In the "seat belt" law enforcement approach,

authorities generally will not enforce laws which require automobile drivers and
passengers to wear seat belts unless another violation of the state's motor vehicle
code occurs. O'Driscoll, supra note 64. EPA's enforcement approach for section
3004 0 ) is similar, in that only if inspections reveal another RCRA violation (other
than a violation of section 3004(j)), or a pattern of violations that evince a disregard for compliance with EPA regulations, will EPA attach a greater enforcement
priority to that facility. Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note
10, at 42,731.
126. As the court in Edison Electric noted: "EPA has declared, in effect, that it
does not intend to enforce its interpretation of section 3004(j) against mixed waste
generators." Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 334; see also Section 3004(j) Enforcement
Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,731 (stating that violations of section 3004 (j)
involving relatively small volumes of mixed waste will receive a reduced civil enforcement priority).
127. "[T]he policy does not apply to any facility that generated more than
1,000 cubic feet of prohibited mixed wastes during the calendar year 1994, or that
does so during any succeeding calendar year that this policy is in effect." Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 15, at 18,815.
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stricter enforcement by state environmental agencies. 28 Taking a
"hands-off" approach to smaller generators of mixed waste may
subject them to state regulatory action that may differ greatly from
one jurisdiction to another.1 29 While omitting low-volume handlers
from strict enforcement of section 3004(j) may allow EPA to more
effectively concentrate its enforcement efforts on larger generators,
EPA's intentions for enforcing the storage prohibition against
larger generators are not articulated in its policy.'

30

This could

lead to confusion among EPA, generators/storers and state regulators over the best ways to handle the problem of mixed-waste storage and enforcement of RCRA section 3004(j).
Another problem with EPA's Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement is that it does not apply to Department of Energy
("DOE") facilities.13 1 This is because the Federal Facilities Compliance Act ("FFCA") temporarily forbids the waiver of sovereign immunity by certain executive branch facilities, including DOE
facilities.13 2 Thus, the FFCA protects DOE from section 3004(j) liability. This could hinder development of treatment capacity, because the FFCA provisions have the effect of shifting the cost of
developing new treatment capacity onto commercial mixed waste
128. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 334; see generally Section 3004(j) Enforcement
Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 42,731. RCRA permits private actions by individuals for damages resulting from RCRA violations. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a).
129. [The Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement]
is not applicable in States where mixed waste is not regulated under
RCRA, i.e., in authorized States which lack specific EPA approval of
mixed waste regulatory programs. In those States where the State, as well
as EPA, has authority to enforce the LDRs, this policy affects only the EPA
enforcement programs.
Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 15, at
18,815.
130. See generally Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, szipra note
10.
131. See Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, suprfa
note 15, at 18,815.
132. See Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992 ("FFCA"), Pub. L. No. 102386, 106 Stat. 1505 (amending RCRA and codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, Vupra
note 15, at 18,815. The FFCA's primary purpose is to insure that federal facilities
are treated the same as private parties with regard to compliance with RCRA. See
Federal Facility Compliance Act; Enforcement Authorities Implementation, 58
Fed. Reg. 49,044 (1993). However, the FFCA "delays the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to fines and penalties fo, violations of RCRA section 3004 (j)
involving storage of mixed waste for three years from October, 1992, so long as the
waste is managed in compliance with all other applicable requirements." Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 15, at 18,815.
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handlers, and away from DOE, which is currently the single largest
13 3
mixed waste handler in the United States.
Finally, it appears that the Section 30040) Enforcement Policy
has not been effective. EPA has indicated that under its policy,
fines have not been levied "to any significant extent" in enforcing
the mixed waste storage ban.13 4 Such enforcement does not act as
a sufficient inducement to compel generators to develop the technology necessary for the safe treatment or disposal of mixed wastes.
In enacting RCRA section 3004(j), Congress intended to completely eradicate storage of LDR hazardous wastes.13 5 The faults
outlined above indicate that EPA's Section 3004(j) Enforcement
Policy may not fulfill Congress' goals. In order to fulfill Congress'
express intent, EPA will have to implement a much more aggressive
enforcement policy. There is legislative history which supports a
more stringent enforcement approach. During congressional debate preceding the enactment of RCRA, Representative Forsythe indicated in his floor statement the need for a more stringent
enforcement approach: "Hazardous waste generators must understand that if there is no ultimate, acceptable disposal technique
available for the hazardous wastes which they generate, they should
not generate them."' 36 Such legislative history is one more indication that EPA should consider a more aggressive enforcement approach for section 30040). Arguably, unless and until a stronger
enforcement approach is adopted, the type of incentives needed to
induce the development of adequate treatment or disposal technology will be lacking. Thus, the current situation - indefinite storage of mixed wastes in violation of RCRA - will only continue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Edison Electric, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the Edison Electric Institute's petition for review of EPA's interpretation of RCRA section 3004(j) and its
implementing regulations. The court upheld EPA's interpretation
133. Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note
15, at 18,814. "[T]he prospects for new mixed waste treatment capacity are driven
largely by the treatment needs identified by the DOE, since DOE's waste volumes
dwarf those of the commercial sector." Id.
134. Telephone Interview with Richard LaShier of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's Office of Solid Waste, State and Regional Programs Branch
(Sept. 16, 1994).
135. For a discussion of the congressional intent behind the enactment of
§ 3004(j), see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text
136. 129 CONG. REc. 27.660, 27.669.
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of the section and its enforcement policy, holding that section
3004(j) prohibited the indefinite storage of mixed wastes pending
the development of adequate treatment techniques or disposal
13 7
capacity.
EPA's Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement is scheduled to terminate on April 20, 1996.'3 8 EPA has indicated that until
that time, it will continue to evaluate its policy in light of new information on the generation and treatment of mixed wastes.1 39 In examining its policy for section 3004(j), EPA should consider whether
the congressional intent behind the storage prohibition demands a
more stringent enforcement approach than that of EPA's Section
3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement. 140 While a more stringent
approach might prove difficult to implement, Congress' clearly expressed purpose in enacting the technology-forcing RCRA may demand just such an approach.
George A. Voegele, .Jr.
137. Edison Elec., 996 F.2d at 328.
138. Extension of Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note
15, at 18,815.
139. Id.
140. For a discussion of EPA's Section 3004(j) Enforcement Policy Statement,
see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
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